Carries 21 template commits: the shared IndexedDB connection/transaction
kernel and the four runtimes moved onto it, the adapter barrel boundary and
the architecture rule that enforces it, the feature adapter contribution
model, `feature-http-binding`, the split of several oversized test files,
and the release identity now derived from the package name.
Product identity is unchanged. The three hard-coded `tech-log-frontend/…`
verifier ids are gone because the template derives them from the package
name and this package is `tech-log-frontend`.
Two decisions worth naming. The platform HTTP executor is the template's
verbatim — it now takes the installed contract so a feature's types flow
through the binding — and TechLog's four gateways, which address operations
by id, reach it through one adapter at the composition root instead of being
rewritten here. And the three derived CI baselines were recomputed from the
merged `config/ci/gates.json` rather than taken from either side: 94 command
definitions, 106 references, 141 artifacts, gate shape `629e5898…`. The
method was checked by first reproducing the pre-merge values from the
pre-merge file.
Verified here: types, lint, architecture, adapter inventory, CI contract,
design system, diagnostics, remediation ledger, browser security and build
all pass; 1789 unit, 152 component, 415 TechLog, 102 integration, 19
reference-feature, 17 recipe and 7 contract tests pass. Five gates stay
red and every one was reproduced at b297d65 first: `check:i18n`,
`check:registries`, `test:runtime-schema`, `verify:documentation` and
`test:sample-removal`.
Full decision record, including what was deliberately not carried and the
five open follow-ups, in `docs/operations/template-sync-2026-09-21.md`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
495 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
495 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash, verify, type KeyObject } from "node:crypto";
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import { z } from "zod";
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import {
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canonicalizeSupplyChainValue,
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PROJECT_NAME,
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supplyChainDigest,
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} from "./supply-chain.ts";
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export const PROVIDER_FUTURE_SKEW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1_000;
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export const PROVIDER_MAX_LIFETIME_MS = 2 * 60 * 60 * 1_000;
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export const PROMOTION_VERIFIER_ID = `${PROJECT_NAME}/promotion-verifier`;
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export const PROMOTION_VERIFIER_VERSION = "3";
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const sha256 = z.string().regex(/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/u);
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const fingerprint = z.string().regex(/^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$/u);
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const revision = z.string().regex(/^(?:[a-f0-9]{40}|[a-f0-9]{64})$/u);
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const nonce = z.string().regex(/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/u);
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const nonEmptyString = z.string().min(1);
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const timestamp = z
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.string()
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.regex(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\.\d{3}Z$/u)
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.refine((value) => new Date(value).toISOString() === value);
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const runSchema = z
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.object({ id: z.string().min(1).max(128), attempt: z.int().min(1).max(1_000) })
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.strict();
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const sourceSchema = z
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.object({ revision, sourceSetSha256: sha256 })
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.strict();
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const candidateSchema = z
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.object({
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archiveSha256: sha256,
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bundleSha256: sha256,
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distSha256: sha256,
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lockfileSha256: sha256,
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})
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.strict();
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const providerRunSchema = runSchema.extend({ invocationNonce: nonce }).strict();
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export const secretScanAttestationSchema = z
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.object({
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status: z.literal("PASS"),
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localEvidenceAssessmentSha256: sha256,
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sourceSetSha256: sha256,
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policySha256: sha256,
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sarifSha256: sha256,
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scanInputSha256: sha256,
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})
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.strict();
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const signatureSchema = z
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.object({
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algorithm: z.literal("Ed25519"),
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keyId: nonEmptyString,
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publicKeyFingerprint: fingerprint,
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value: z.string().regex(/^(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4})*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=)?$/u),
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})
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.strict();
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const providerCommon = {
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schemaVersion: z.literal(2),
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provider: nonEmptyString,
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issuedAt: timestamp,
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expiresAt: timestamp,
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run: providerRunSchema,
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source: sourceSchema,
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candidate: candidateSchema,
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signature: signatureSchema,
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} as const;
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export const vulnerabilityProviderReportSchema = z
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.object({
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...providerCommon,
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evidenceType: z.literal("vulnerability-report"),
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secretScanAttestation: secretScanAttestationSchema,
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findings: z.array(z.record(z.string(), z.json())),
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})
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.strict();
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export const provenanceProviderAttestationSchema = z
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.object({
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...providerCommon,
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evidenceType: z.literal("provenance-attestation"),
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signer: nonEmptyString,
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subject: z
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.object({ name: z.literal("dist"), digest: z.object({ sha256 }).strict() })
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.strict(),
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})
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.strict();
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const verificationCommon = {
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schemaVersion: z.literal(3),
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verifiedAt: timestamp,
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status: z.enum(["PASS", "FAIL_UNVERIFIED"]),
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verifier: z
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.object({ id: nonEmptyString, version: nonEmptyString })
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.strict(),
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run: runSchema,
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source: sourceSchema,
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candidate: candidateSchema,
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providerEvidence: z
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.object({
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vulnerabilityReportSha256: sha256,
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provenanceAttestationSha256: sha256,
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vulnerabilityInvocationNonce: nonce,
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provenanceInvocationNonce: nonce,
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vulnerabilityKeyId: nonEmptyString,
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vulnerabilityKeyFingerprint: fingerprint,
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provenanceKeyId: nonEmptyString,
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provenanceKeyFingerprint: fingerprint,
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secretScanAttestation: secretScanAttestationSchema,
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})
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.strict(),
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trustPolicySha256: sha256,
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failures: z.array(z.string()),
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} as const;
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const providerVerificationV3Schema = z
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.object({
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...verificationCommon,
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artifactType: z.literal("provider-verification"),
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vulnerabilityStatus: z.enum(["PASS", "FAIL_UNVERIFIED"]),
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provenanceAttestationStatus: z.enum(["PASS", "FAIL_UNVERIFIED"]),
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})
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.strict();
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const promotionVerificationV3Schema = z
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.object({
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...verificationCommon,
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artifactType: z.literal("promotion-verification"),
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localEvidenceStatus: z.enum(["PASS", "FAIL"]),
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localEvidenceAssessmentSha256: sha256,
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providerVerificationSha256: sha256,
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})
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.strict();
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export const providerVerificationArtifactSchema = z
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.discriminatedUnion("artifactType", [
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providerVerificationV3Schema,
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promotionVerificationV3Schema,
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])
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.superRefine((record, context) => {
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const subordinatePass =
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record.artifactType === "provider-verification"
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? record.vulnerabilityStatus === "PASS" &&
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record.provenanceAttestationStatus === "PASS"
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: record.localEvidenceStatus === "PASS";
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const coherentPass = subordinatePass && record.failures.length === 0;
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if ((record.status === "PASS") !== coherentPass) {
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context.addIssue({
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code: "custom",
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path: ["status"],
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message: "verification PASS must agree with subordinate statuses and failures",
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});
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}
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if (record.status === "FAIL_UNVERIFIED" && record.failures.length === 0) {
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context.addIssue({
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code: "custom",
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path: ["failures"],
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message: "failed verification requires a failure diagnostic",
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});
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}
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});
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export type ProviderVerificationArtifactType = z.infer<
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typeof providerVerificationArtifactSchema
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>["artifactType"];
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export type ProviderTrust = Readonly<{
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keyId: string;
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publicKey: KeyObject;
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publicKeyFingerprint: string;
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}>;
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export type ExpectedPromotionContext = Readonly<{
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run: Readonly<{ id: string; attempt: number }>;
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source: Readonly<{ revision: string; sourceSetSha256: string }>;
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candidate: Readonly<{
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archiveSha256: string;
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bundleSha256: string;
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distSha256: string;
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lockfileSha256: string;
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}>;
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vulnerabilityInvocationNonce: string;
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provenanceInvocationNonce: string;
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secretScanAttestation: z.infer<typeof secretScanAttestationSchema>;
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}>;
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export type PromotionEvidenceResult = Readonly<{
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status: "PASS" | "FAIL_UNVERIFIED";
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vulnerabilityStatus: "PASS" | "FAIL_UNVERIFIED";
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provenanceAttestationStatus: "PASS" | "FAIL_UNVERIFIED";
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failures: readonly string[];
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}>;
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export function validateProviderEvidence(input: Readonly<{
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kind: "vulnerability" | "provenance";
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value: unknown;
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expected: ExpectedPromotionContext;
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trust: ProviderTrust | null;
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nowEpochMs?: () => number;
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}>): Readonly<{
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evidence: unknown | null;
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status: "PASS" | "FAIL_UNVERIFIED";
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failures: readonly string[];
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}> {
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const failures: string[] = [];
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const now = (input.nowEpochMs ?? Date.now)();
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if (input.kind === "vulnerability") {
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const parsed = vulnerabilityProviderReportSchema.safeParse(input.value);
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if (!parsed.success) {
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return Object.freeze({
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evidence: null,
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status: "FAIL_UNVERIFIED",
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failures: Object.freeze([
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"external vulnerability provider report is missing or invalid",
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]),
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});
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}
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validateCommonContext(
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"vulnerability report",
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parsed.data,
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input.expected,
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input.expected.vulnerabilityInvocationNonce,
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input.trust,
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now,
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failures,
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);
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if (
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JSON.stringify(parsed.data.secretScanAttestation) !==
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JSON.stringify(input.expected.secretScanAttestation)
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) {
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failures.push("vulnerability report secret scan attestation mismatch");
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}
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if (parsed.data.findings.length > 0) {
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failures.push("vulnerability report contains findings");
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}
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return Object.freeze({
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evidence: parsed.data,
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status: failures.length === 0 ? "PASS" : "FAIL_UNVERIFIED",
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failures: Object.freeze(failures),
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});
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}
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const parsed = provenanceProviderAttestationSchema.safeParse(input.value);
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if (!parsed.success) {
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return Object.freeze({
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evidence: null,
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status: "FAIL_UNVERIFIED",
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failures: Object.freeze([
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"external signed provenance attestation is missing or invalid",
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]),
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});
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}
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validateCommonContext(
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"provenance attestation",
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parsed.data,
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input.expected,
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input.expected.provenanceInvocationNonce,
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input.trust,
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now,
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failures,
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);
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if (parsed.data.subject.digest.sha256 !== input.expected.candidate.distSha256) {
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failures.push("provenance attestation subject dist digest mismatch");
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}
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return Object.freeze({
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evidence: parsed.data,
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status: failures.length === 0 ? "PASS" : "FAIL_UNVERIFIED",
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failures: Object.freeze(failures),
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});
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}
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export function providerEvidenceSignaturePayload(value: unknown): Buffer {
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if (!isRecord(value)) return Buffer.from("null", "utf8");
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const { signature: _signature, ...payload } = value;
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return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(canonicalizeSupplyChainValue(payload)), "utf8");
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}
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export function providerPublicKeyFingerprint(publicKey: KeyObject): string {
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if (publicKey.asymmetricKeyType !== "ed25519") {
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throw new TypeError("provider trust key must be Ed25519");
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}
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return `sha256:${createHash("sha256")
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.update(publicKey.export({ type: "spki", format: "der" }))
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.digest("hex")}`;
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}
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export function createTrustPolicy(input: Readonly<{
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vulnerabilityTrust: ProviderTrust;
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provenanceTrust: ProviderTrust;
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}>) {
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assertDistinctProviderTrust(input);
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return Object.freeze({
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algorithm: "Ed25519" as const,
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vulnerability: Object.freeze({
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keyId: input.vulnerabilityTrust.keyId,
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publicKeyFingerprint: input.vulnerabilityTrust.publicKeyFingerprint,
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}),
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provenance: Object.freeze({
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keyId: input.provenanceTrust.keyId,
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publicKeyFingerprint: input.provenanceTrust.publicKeyFingerprint,
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}),
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issuedAtFutureSkewMs: PROVIDER_FUTURE_SKEW_MS,
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maximumLifetimeMs: PROVIDER_MAX_LIFETIME_MS,
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});
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}
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export function assertDistinctProviderTrust(input: Readonly<{
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vulnerabilityTrust: ProviderTrust;
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provenanceTrust: ProviderTrust;
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}>): void {
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const vulnerabilityFingerprint = providerPublicKeyFingerprint(
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input.vulnerabilityTrust.publicKey,
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);
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const provenanceFingerprint = providerPublicKeyFingerprint(
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input.provenanceTrust.publicKey,
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);
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if (
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input.vulnerabilityTrust.keyId === input.provenanceTrust.keyId ||
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vulnerabilityFingerprint === provenanceFingerprint ||
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input.vulnerabilityTrust.publicKeyFingerprint ===
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input.provenanceTrust.publicKeyFingerprint
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) {
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throw new TypeError("provider trust roles require distinct key identities and DER-SPKI fingerprints");
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}
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}
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export function trustPolicySha256(input: Readonly<{
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vulnerabilityTrust: ProviderTrust;
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provenanceTrust: ProviderTrust;
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}>): string {
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return supplyChainDigest(createTrustPolicy(input));
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}
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export function evaluatePromotionEvidence(input: Readonly<{
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expected: ExpectedPromotionContext;
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localStatus: unknown;
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vulnerabilityReport: unknown;
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provenanceAttestation: unknown;
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vulnerabilityTrust: ProviderTrust | null;
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provenanceTrust: ProviderTrust | null;
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nowEpochMs?: () => number;
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}>): PromotionEvidenceResult {
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const failures: string[] = [];
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if (input.localStatus !== "PASS") {
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failures.push("local supply-chain evidence is not PASS");
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}
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const now = (input.nowEpochMs ?? Date.now)();
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let vulnerabilityStatus: "PASS" | "FAIL_UNVERIFIED" = "FAIL_UNVERIFIED";
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let provenanceAttestationStatus: "PASS" | "FAIL_UNVERIFIED" = "FAIL_UNVERIFIED";
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const vulnerability = vulnerabilityProviderReportSchema.safeParse(
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input.vulnerabilityReport,
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);
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if (!vulnerability.success) {
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failures.push("external vulnerability provider report is missing or invalid");
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} else {
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const before = failures.length;
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validateCommonContext(
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"vulnerability report",
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vulnerability.data,
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input.expected,
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input.expected.vulnerabilityInvocationNonce,
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input.vulnerabilityTrust,
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now,
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failures,
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);
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if (
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JSON.stringify(vulnerability.data.secretScanAttestation) !==
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JSON.stringify(input.expected.secretScanAttestation)
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) {
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failures.push("vulnerability report secret scan attestation mismatch");
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}
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if (vulnerability.data.findings.length > 0) {
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failures.push("vulnerability report contains findings");
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}
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if (failures.length === before && input.localStatus === "PASS") {
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vulnerabilityStatus = "PASS";
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}
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}
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const provenance = provenanceProviderAttestationSchema.safeParse(
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input.provenanceAttestation,
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);
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if (!provenance.success) {
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failures.push("external signed provenance attestation is missing or invalid");
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} else {
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const before = failures.length;
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validateCommonContext(
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"provenance attestation",
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provenance.data,
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input.expected,
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input.expected.provenanceInvocationNonce,
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input.provenanceTrust,
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now,
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failures,
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);
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if (provenance.data.subject.digest.sha256 !== input.expected.candidate.distSha256) {
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failures.push("provenance attestation subject dist digest mismatch");
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}
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if (failures.length === before && input.localStatus === "PASS") {
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provenanceAttestationStatus = "PASS";
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}
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}
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return Object.freeze({
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status:
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failures.length === 0 &&
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vulnerabilityStatus === "PASS" &&
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provenanceAttestationStatus === "PASS"
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? "PASS"
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: "FAIL_UNVERIFIED",
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vulnerabilityStatus,
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provenanceAttestationStatus,
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failures: Object.freeze(failures),
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});
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}
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|
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function validateCommonContext(
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label: "vulnerability report" | "provenance attestation",
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evidence: z.infer<
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| typeof vulnerabilityProviderReportSchema
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| typeof provenanceProviderAttestationSchema
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>,
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expected: ExpectedPromotionContext,
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expectedNonce: string,
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trust: ProviderTrust | null,
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now: number,
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failures: string[],
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): void {
|
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if (
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evidence.run.id !== expected.run.id ||
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evidence.run.attempt !== expected.run.attempt
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) {
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failures.push(`${label} run identity mismatch`);
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|
}
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|
if (evidence.run.invocationNonce !== expectedNonce) {
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|
failures.push(`${label} invocation nonce mismatch`);
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|
}
|
|
if (
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evidence.source.revision !== expected.source.revision ||
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evidence.source.sourceSetSha256 !== expected.source.sourceSetSha256
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) {
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failures.push(`${label} source identity mismatch`);
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|
}
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|
if (JSON.stringify(evidence.candidate) !== JSON.stringify(expected.candidate)) {
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failures.push(`${label} candidate identity mismatch`);
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|
}
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validateEvidenceTime(label, evidence.issuedAt, evidence.expiresAt, now, failures);
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|
if (
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!trust ||
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|
evidence.signature.keyId !== trust.keyId ||
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evidence.signature.publicKeyFingerprint !== trust.publicKeyFingerprint
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) {
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failures.push(`${label} trust identity mismatch`);
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|
return;
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|
}
|
|
try {
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|
if (
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|
providerPublicKeyFingerprint(trust.publicKey) !== trust.publicKeyFingerprint ||
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|
!verify(
|
|
null,
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|
providerEvidenceSignaturePayload(evidence),
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|
trust.publicKey,
|
|
Buffer.from(evidence.signature.value, "base64"),
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|
)
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|
) {
|
|
failures.push(`${label} signature verification failed`);
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|
}
|
|
} catch {
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|
failures.push(`${label} signature verification failed`);
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|
}
|
|
}
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|
|
function validateEvidenceTime(
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|
label: string,
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|
issuedAt: string,
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|
expiresAt: string,
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|
now: number,
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|
failures: string[],
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|
): void {
|
|
const issued = Date.parse(issuedAt);
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|
const expires = Date.parse(expiresAt);
|
|
if (issued > now + PROVIDER_FUTURE_SKEW_MS) {
|
|
failures.push(`${label} issuedAt exceeds allowed future skew`);
|
|
}
|
|
if (expires <= now) failures.push(`${label} is expired`);
|
|
if (expires <= issued) failures.push(`${label} validity window is not positive`);
|
|
if (expires - issued > PROVIDER_MAX_LIFETIME_MS) {
|
|
failures.push(`${label} validity window exceeds two hours`);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
|
|
return Boolean(value) && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value);
|
|
}
|