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clean-architecture-backend-…/compose/redis/acl/README.md
T
DongHyeonka 50cd7154d0 refactor(compose)!: compose 파일을 개발 환경 하나와 lane fixture로 나눈다
문제:
- 루트 compose 6개와 infra/ 아래 12개가 개발 환경, 테스트 lane fixture,
  보조 파일을 가리지 않고 섞여 있다. 이름 모양도 셋이다.
- README 빠른 시작 scripts/bootstrap-local.sh는 docker-compose.yml과
  .local.yml만 합친 뒤, 둘 어디에도 없는 db 서비스를 띄우려다 멈춘다.
- compose smoke all-adapters lane은 앱이 mem_limit 512m를 넘어 커널에
  죽고(OOM), restart: unless-stopped로 다시 떠서 죽는 때가 smoke 요청과
  겹칠 때만 실패한다. smoke는 재시작을 보지 않아 나머지 실행은 거짓 통과다.

고른 방법(소유자 결정 2026-11-07):
- 루트에 개발용 compose.yaml 하나. app(local 런타임)과 뒷단 서비스를
  capability profile(jpa, redis, kafka, mongo, objectstorage, auth, mail)로
  고른다. 마운트하는 보조 파일은 compose/(keycloak, minio init, Redis ACL,
  mailpit 인증서 폴더).
- lane fixture는 lane을 가진 leaf로: dev·prod-smoke·tls overlay, fileserver
  overlay, smoke·스키마 적용 서비스(lane-services.yaml)와 스크립트, lane
  계약 JSON → src/app-bootstrap/compose-lanes/. Redis topology →
  redis-sdk/compose/, NFS → fileserver/compose/nfs/. infra/는 없어진다.
- 계약의 composeProfile(문자열)을 composeProfiles(목록)로 바꾼다. lane이
  backing profile과 lane profile을 함께 켠다. 18 lane의 서비스 집합은
  전과 같다(verify-compose-profile-contracts.sh가 정확히 대조).
- smoke: lane이 끝나기 전에 그 project의 모든 컨테이너가 재시작 0,
  OOMKilled false인지 보고 아니면 실패한다. 앱의 memory.peak를 증거로
  남긴다. all-adapters만 appMemoryLimit 1g(계약 칸, smoke가 overlay에 씀).
- bootstrap-local.sh는 compose.yaml로 db와 app을 띄운다(인자 없음).
- 개발 compose와 lane 바탕이 같은 파일이라, app healthcheck는 모든
  런타임에서 답하는 관리 포트 readiness로 둔다.
버린 대안: lane을 Testcontainers로 옮기기(설계 다-2, 별도 판단), lane마다
기본 메모리를 올리기(배포 기본값 512m 계약을 흐림).

위험·한계:
- 개발 compose의 app이 src/.env를 읽으므로, 개발자 src/.env가 dev·prod
  lane에도 들어간다. lane 값은 생성 overlay의 environment가 이기고, CI에는
  src/.env가 없다.
- MinIO 이미지 기본값이 compose.yaml과 lane-services.yaml 두 곳에 있다
  (YAML anchor는 파일을 넘지 못한다). ComposeMinioImageMatchesEvidenceTest가
  둘 다 evidence digest와 대조한다.
- env 키 검사(verifyEnvKeys)는 compose.yaml과 lane overlay를 읽고
  lane-services.yaml(smoke client 변수)은 뺀다.

검증(desktop, 트리 6d1e9f9d → 주석·문서만 고친 d0703901, ~/t1-layout-logs/):
- verify-compose-profile-contracts.sh rc=0 (18 lane 정확히 일치)
- :app-bootstrap:check :app-bootstrap:documentContractTest
  :app-bootstrap:verifyEnvKeys와 objectstorage·cache-redis·redis-sdk·
  redis-runtime·fileserver·composition:fileserver-platform check rc=0
- :app-bootstrap:integrationTest(ComposeMergeCharacterizationTest 포함),
  :adapter:outbound:cache-redis:redisContainerContractTest rc=0
- -p build-logic check rc=0, :verifyStrictLaneStages --dry-run rc=0
- scripts/run-compose-runtime-smoke.sh --matrix(18 lane) rc=0, 794초.
  모든 lane 컨테이너 재시작 0·OOMKilled false. 앱 memory.peak 최고
  all-adapters 532MiB(512m 한도를 넘는 값이라 1g의 근거), 나머지 244~422MiB
- scripts/bootstrap-local.sh rc=0(db·app 기동, /api/healthcheck 200 UP).
  기준 ac03192d의 base+local 조합은 config --services가 app뿐이고
  up --wait db가 "no such service: db"로 rc=1
- 정리할 때 `docker compose down`은 profile 서비스(db)를 남겨
  README·compose.yaml 안내를 `--profile '*' down`으로 고치고 다시 확인
- 주석·문서 수정 뒤 :app-bootstrap:repositoryContractTest
  :app-bootstrap:documentContractTest, verify-compose rc=0

Refs: design-docs repo-structure/README.md 3.1, repo-structure/01-backend-layout.md 6.3
BREAKING CHANGE: 루트 docker-compose*.yml과 infra/가 없어지고 compose.yaml(profile)·compose/·leaf 안 lane fixture로 옮겨졌다. lane 계약은 src/app-bootstrap/compose-lanes/compose-profile-contracts.json, composeProfile → composeProfiles. docs/upgrade/2026-11-maturity-review.md B-51.
2026-11-07 12:52:36 +09:00

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# ACL accounts — test fixtures, not a deployment file
**Nothing in this directory is loaded by a deployment.** Every file here is a fixture for the local
and test lanes: its passwords are public (`fixture-*`, written in this repository), and
`lane-fixture-accounts.acl` also provisions three accounts that only a lane topology needs — among
them `ca-skeleton-cluster-bootstrap`, which has `~* &* +@all`, every command on every key. Loaded into
a real Redis, that line alone gives anyone who can reach the server and read this repository full
control of it (`CONFIG`, `MODULE`, every key). A deployment writes its own ACL file of the same
shape: the application accounts it actually uses, passwords from its secret store, and none of the
lane-only accounts (review 2026-11-03 RR-07-04). The application enforces its half of that: under
the `prod` runtime profile it refuses to start while a secret holds a value beginning with
`fixture-` (`SecretSourceValidator`): a key the secrets registry classifies `secret`, a variable a
module's `RequiredProductionSecrets` bean names, or the variable a `secret://…/<VAR>` credential
reference in the environment names. A reference held in code — the typed SDK's admin account,
contributed as a `RedisAccountContribution` bean — is none of those: the composer names its variable
in a `RequiredProductionSecrets` bean too (`src/adapter/outbound/redis-sdk/README.md`), or the
`fixture-admin` password passes. A deployment that copied a lane's
`APP_REDIS_AUTHENTICATION_*_REFERENCE` and `REDIS_LANE_*` values stops before it connects. Values
that are not secrets — a pod's `HOSTNAME`, an application name — are not read, because `fixture-`
is an ordinary word as well.
One file per `CommandAccess` level. Each account is deliberately narrower than the SDK's own rules:
the account is the last enforcement boundary and a permit issued inside the process never widens it,
so a mistake in the SDK is still refused by the server.
A Redis ACL file accepts nothing but complete `user` lines — no comments and no line continuations —
which is why the rationale lives here instead of inline.
Every account here carries a **fixture** password (`fixture-*`). They are written down rather than
left as `nopass` because an account that accepts any password makes every assertion about
authentication pass for the same reason a typo would have — and because these files are what a fork
copies. The four per-role files carried `nopass` long after the combined lane file had been fixed;
a fork that copied one of them got an open account and a green lane.
| File | Account | Grants |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `application.acl` | `CommandAccess.APPLICATION` | the typed data-structure commands over `prod:*`, with the dangerous and deprecated names denied |
| `application-advanced.acl` | `APPLICATION_ADVANCED` | the above plus pub/sub, transactions, and the registered-script path. `EVAL` is absent: only `EVALSHA` of an already loaded digest is reachable. `+time` is granted because the rate-limit and idempotency scripts read the server clock with `redis.call('TIME')`, and `TIME` is in no data category (`@read`/`@write`): without it every such script fails with an ACL error. The startup SCRIPT probe runs `TIME` so a template missing it fails at boot |
| `raw-gateway.acl` | `RAW_GATEWAY` | exactly the commands the catalog classifies `RAW_ONLY`, and nothing else |
| `lane-fixture-accounts.acl` | – | what the lanes load (Redis takes one `aclfile`): `user default off`, the four per-role accounts of this table, and three lane-only accounts — `ca-skeleton-replication` (replica sync) and `ca-skeleton-sentinel` for the replicated and sentinel topologies, `ca-skeleton-cluster-bootstrap` (`+@all`) to create the cluster lane's slots. Never a deployment file |
| `admin-readonly.acl` | `ADMIN_READONLY` | read-only diagnostics. Every destructive counterpart is denied here and blocked in the command policy catalog — two independent controls for the same rule |
## Who loads `lane-fixture-accounts.acl`
The Redis topology lanes (`src/adapter/outbound/redis-sdk/compose/{standalone,sentinel,cluster,tls}`), the
application's Compose lanes that switch Redis on (`local-redis`, `all-adapters` in
`src/app-bootstrap/compose-lanes/compose-profile-contracts.json`), and the development stack's
`redis` service (root `compose.yaml`). They all mount this directory read-only; neither
keeps a copy, because a second copy of these lines is a second place for a password or a key
pattern to drift.
The Compose lanes connect the application as `ca-skeleton-application` and
`ca-skeleton-application-advanced`, through `secret://<account>@environment/<variable>` references
whose variables carry the fixture passwords above. They run with the Redis namespace environment
`prod`, because every account here is fenced to `~prod:*`. `scripts/verify-compose-profile-contracts.sh`
compares each Redis lane's references, passwords and namespace with the account lines in this file,
so changing a password or a key pattern here without the lanes fails that check rather than the
lane's first command.